Absence of cross-modality analogical transfer in perceptual categorization by Edmunds, C et al.
Open Journal of Experimental Psychology andNeuroscience, 2020, Vol. 1, pp. 3–13. https://doi.org/10.46221/ojepn.2020.8639
Absence of cross-modality analogical transfer in perceptual
categorization
C. E. R. Edmunds∗ Angus B. Inkster† Peter M. Jones† Fraser Milton‡ Andy J. Wills†
Abstract
Analogical transfer has been previously reported to occur between rule-based, but not information-integration, perceptual
category structures (Casale, Roeder, & Ashby, 2012). The current study investigated whether a similar pattern of results would
be observed in cross-modality transfer. Participants were trained on either a rule-based structure, or an information-integration
structure, using visual stimuli. They were then tested on auditory stimuli that had the same underlying abstract category
structure. Transfer performance was assessed relative to a control group who did not receive training on the visual stimuli. No
cross-modality transfer was found, irrespective of the category structure employed.
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1 Introduction
Analogical transfer is the ability to transfer knowledge of
structural features of a problem from one domain to another
(Gentner & Maravilla, 2018). The canonical example (Gick
&Holyoak, 1980) asked: “how do you destroy a tumor using
intense radiation without damaging the surrounding tissue?”
(Duncker, 1945). People found this easier to solve if they had
previously experienced an analogous problem in a military
context (“how can you storm a castle with a large army when
the surrounding bridges are weak?”). Obviously, the worth
of transferring knowledge extends far beyond satisfying the
whims of experimental psychologists. For instance, it is
central to scientific work, from hypothesis generation to data
interpretation (Dunbar, 1997). Further, without analogical
transfer much of the effectiveness of education is lost (Ford,
Baldwin, & Prasad, 2018). After all, who would trust a
nurse (Johnston, Coyer, & Nash, 2017) or engineer (Chase,
Malkiewich, & Kumar, 2019) who is unable to generalise
their training?
In the transfer literature, one rarely-explored task is per-
ceptual categorization, where people learn to label groups of
perceptually similar stimuli (Kurtz, 2015). For instance, a
doctor might categorize scans as showing evidence of cancer
or remission (Hornsby & Love, 2014). Analogical transfer
research on perceptual categorization has solely examined
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unidimensional and information-integration tasks (see Fig-
ure 1; Ashby &Gott, 1988).1 For ease of exposition, assume
we are categorizingGabor patches varying in the number and
orientation of bars. In unidimensional (UD) tasks (see Fig-
ure 1A), participants sort stimuli using a single dimension:
“Patches with bars orientated less than 45 degrees are in
Category A; otherwise they are in Category B.” In contrast,
in information-integration (II) tasks (see Figure 1B) partic-
ipants combine features from two incommensurable dimen-
sions.2 These two tasks are rotations of each other in stimu-
lus space and so are argued to be well-matched on between-
category distance, within-category similarity and difficulty
(e.g. Smith, Boomer, et al., 2014; Ashby and Valentin, 2018;
although see Newell, Dunn, and Kalish, 2011). Indeed, a
large literature has been built on the assumption that the
principal difference between these two structures is that they
differ in how easy it is to describe the decision-boundary be-
tween the categories (Ashby & Maddox, 2005, 2011; Ashby
& Valentin, 2017).
Despite their many similarities, these categorization tasks
do not appear to be equally amenable to analogical transfer.
In this context, analogical transfer would be shown “if a par-
ticipant is able to apply a classification strategy learned with
one set of stimuli to a set of novel, perceptually distinct stim-
uli” (Casale et al., 2012, p. 434). In Casale et al.’s (2012)
experiments, participants learned to categorize Gabor patch
stimuli according to a UD or II structure. To test the extent
1There has also beenwork examining the transfer of relational categories
which is outside the definition of perceptual categorization used here.
2II structures are difficult to describe. However, for those interested, a
possible description of an II category in Gabor patch stimuli is “If there
are more bars than the bars are upright then the stimulus is in Category A,
otherwise it is in B.” This description sounds nonsensical and so is unlikely
to be identified by participants.
3
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Figure 1: Examples of A. Unidimensional, B. Information-integration and C. conjunction category structures. Each circle
represents a stimulus. Filled circles indicate stimuli belonging to Category A, and empty circles those belonging to Category B.
of analogical transfer, participants then completed similar
categorization tasks with stimuli perceptually distinct from
the training set. These novel test stimuli were chosen such
that the between-category decision boundary was the same
for both sets of stimuli. Across three experiments Casale et
al. found that participants who learned a UD structure could
transfer that knowledge to another stimulus space region.
However, those who learned an II structure could not. In a
similar study that used rectangles of visual static (random
green dots) that varied in dot density and rectangle size, Za-
krzewski, Church, and Smith (2018) found the same pattern
(see also Soto & Ashby, 2019).
In summary, previous studies indicate that analogical
transfer is possible for UD tasks but not for II tasks. How-
ever, these studies limit the inferences we can make about
analogical transfer as they are all examples of so-called “near
transfer,” where both tasks are presented in a similar context,
using similar stimuli (Barnett & Ceci, 2002). Of more inter-
est is “far transfer,” such as the radiation problem mentioned
above, where the surface task features differ between training
and test. After all, the more situations to which we can trans-
fer knowledge, the more use it is. Therefore, in the current
work we investigate far transfer in perceptual categorization.
1.1 The current work
We examined analogical transfer by giving participants a
training phase followed by a test phase with no feedback
(as in Experiment 3 of Casale et al., 2012). However, to
investigate far transfer, we changed the surface features of
the stimuli between training and test. The training stimuli
were boxes intersected by a line that varied in its length
and height within the box (see Figure 2). The test stimuli
were auditory tones that varied in length and pitch. We
chose auditory tones as previous work showed successful
learning of rule-based and II category structures using these
stimuli (Maddox, Ing, & Lauritzen, 2006; Reetzke, Maddox,
& Chandrasekaran, 2016; Smith, Johnston, et al., 2014; Yi,
Maddox, Mumford, & Chandrasekaran, 2016). Successful
analogical transfer required participants to understand that
the length and height of the line is analogous to the length
and pitch of the tone. Further, following previous work in
both categorization (e.g., Edmunds, Milton, & Wills, 2015;
Edmunds, Wills, & Milton, 2016, 2019; Edwards, Williams,
Gentner, & Lombrozo, 2019) and analogical transfer (e.g.,
Gick & Holyoak, 1980), participants were asked to give
verbal reports. We used these reports to examine whether
participants had transferred explicit knowledge between the
phases of the experiment.
In addition to changing the surface features of the stim-
uli, we exchanged the UD rule-based task for a conjunction
(CJ) task (see Figure 1C). As noted above, UD and II tasks
are well-matched on several features, such as the maximum
accuracy achievable, with- and between-category similarity,
category size and so on (e.g., Ashby&Valentin, 2018; Smith,
Boomer, et al., 2014). However, they are not matched on the
number of stimulus dimensions required to make categoriza-
tion responses: UD tasks require attention to one dimension,
II tasks to two. This difference in task complexity previously
undermined some of the experiments using II category tasks
(e.g., Carpenter, Wills, Benattayallah, & Milton, 2016; Ed-
munds et al., 2015). Therefore, we used a CJ task as a more
appropriate control for the II task.
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Finally, we also added a control task. In pilot work3, we
found that the strategies participants reported using differed
from what we predicted. In previous studies, the majority
of participants used the optimum diagonal strategy in the
II task throughout the experiment (Casale et al., 2012; Soto
& Ashby, 2019; Zakrzewski et al., 2018). In contrast, we
found that the majority of participants reported using two-
dimensional rules at training and one-dimensional rules at
test.
One possible explanation is that participants misinter-
preted the change of modality as signaling the start of an
entirely new categorization task. Considered under that lens,
the test phase would appear to participants as a simple unsu-
pervised learning task. There is considerable evidence that
shows that without feedback participants often resort to using
unidimensional rules (e.g. Ashby, Queller, & Berretty, 1999;
Milton, Longmore, & Wills, 2008; Wills, Inkster, & Milton,
2015). Further, using a unidimensional rule in II tasks results
in performance around 75%, well above chance (Edmunds,
Milton, & Wills, 2018). To test this possibility we added
control conditions (one for each category task), where par-
ticipants had to complete the final transfer test without prior
categorization training. This provided us with a baseline to
test improvement when given additional training.
2 Method
2.1 Participants
The participants were 117 undergraduate psychology stu-
dents from the University of Plymouth who received partial
course credit for their participation.
The sample size was calculated a priori using G*Power
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) based on the effect
size of previous work. From the most similar prior experi-
ment (Experiment 3 Casale et al., 2012), we calculated [2? as
0.27 for the key interaction term between performance across
training and test and categorization task. This implied we
needed at least 48 participants to achieve 80% power. Given
that published work often over-estimates effect sizes (Button
et al., 2013) and our task is harder so we might expect a
smaller effect, we increased the number to around thirty per
cell.
2.2 Category structures and stimuli
This experiment had a 2 (Category structure: Conjunction,
Information-integration) x 2 (Task: Control, Analogical
transfer) between-subjects design. The participants were
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions.
There were two sets of stimuli: visual and auditory. The
visual stimuli consisted of 96 monochromatic ‘boxes’ pre-
3available at https://osf.io/mcd7v
Figure 2: Example visual stimulus
sented on a white background (see Figure 2). The stimuli
varied in the length and height of the interior line. This was
calculated in pixels from the abstract coordinates (see be-
low) using 5 (G) = G/6 − 0.15 for the length dimension and
5 (G) = G/105 for the line-height dimension. The width of
the interior line (24 pixels) and the size of the outer square
box (each side was 200 pixels long and 3 pixels thick) re-
mained constant throughout the experiment.
The abstract coordinates are shown in Table 1. The au-
ditory stimuli were 96 tones based on those used by Mad-
dox et al. (2006), that varied in duration and pitch. They
were narrow-band noise, created by combining 50 inde-
pendent phase sine waves. The frequencies of the stimuli
were drawn from a normal distribution with a mean value
of  Hz and a standard deviation of 15.7.  were given by
 = 1000 ∗  + 150 where  are the coordinates for height
from the visual stimuli. The durations of the stimuli were
given by the equation  = 2 ∗ (0.1 + 10!−1), where ! are
the arbitrary stimulus coordinates for length from the visual
stimuli.
The category structures were also counterbalanced. For
the CJ structure, this resulted in four structures equivalent
to rotating the category structure in Table 1 by c/2 each
time. There were 19 participants who assigned the top-left to
Category A, 19 who assigned the top-right, 10 who assigned
the bottom-left and 11 who assigned the bottom-right. For
the II structure, there were two structures each a c rotation of
the other. There were 28 participants who learned a category
Table 1: Abstract category structures
Height Length
` f ` f 2>EGH
Conjunction
A 0.3 0.12 0.8 0.12
B 0.3 0.12 0.4 0.12
B 0.7 0.12 0.4 0.12
B 0.7 0.12 0.8 0.12
Information-integration
A 3.1562 0.667 66.5 12.247 5
B 4.7546 0.667 37 12.247 5
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structure with a positive correlation between dimensions and
30 that learned the rotation.
2.3 The questionnaire
After they had completed the computer portion of the task,
each participant answered the questions reproduced in Ta-
ble 2. Participants in the control condition completed the
three relevant questions from the longer questionnaire.
We also asked two multiple choice questions about the
visual and auditory tasks respectively. However, due to an
error these were not interpretable and so have not been fur-
ther considered.
Note that in previous experiments using these types of
category structures, researchers have used a model-based
decision-bound analysis informed by signal detection theory
(Ashby & Gott, 1988; Maddox & Ashby, 1993). However,
recent work has shown that this analysis can be unreliable
and consequently hard to interpret (Donkin, Newell, Kalish,
Dunn, & Nosofsky, 2015; Edmunds et al., 2018). Therefore,
we have not included a description of this analysis in the
main text, although it is available in the Appendix for those
interested.
2.4 Materials
The experiment was run on a PC connected to a 22-inchmon-
itor with a 16:9 aspect ratio using E-Prime 2.0. Responses
were made using a standard keyboard. The auditory stimuli
were presented on Behringer HPM1000 on-ear headphones.
2.5 Procedure
Participants in the analogical transfer conditions completed
both the training and test phases, whereas participants in
the control condition only completed the test phase. The
specific stimuli each participant was shown depended on the
condition they were assigned. The training phase consisted
of four blocks of 96 training trials. Participants were told
they would be shown some ‘boxes’ containing a single line
and that their task was to identify the box as either Category
AorCategoryB. Participantswere also informed that the box
stimuli would differ on two dimensions, height and length.
Participants were told to indicate the category by pressing
‘Z’ for CategoryA and ‘M’ for Category B. Participants were
told that they would have to guess which category each ‘box’
belonged to at the start but that through corrective feedback
they could achieve high accuracy.
On each trial, the participants were presented with a box
stimulus for 1000ms, which approximatelymatched the aver-
age duration of the auditory stimuli. This was replaced with
the question “Category A or Category B?” This remained
onscreen for 1000 ms. Once a response was detected, feed-
back was displayed for 1000 ms: either “Correct” in blue,
or “Incorrect” in red as appropriate. If the participant failed
to respond within 1000 ms, “TIME OUT” was displayed in
red instead of feedback. The inter-trial interval was 500 ms.
There were no signals to indicate the end or beginning of an
experimental block.
The test phase consisted of a single block of 96 auditory
stimuli. Participants were told that they would hear a series
of sounds varying in duration and pitch. They were told
that they would have to categorize the sounds by pressing
“Z” for Category A or “M” for Category B. Participants did
not receive feedback for this part of the experiment. As in
Maddox et al. (2006), the loudness of the stimuli were not
controlled using a normalisation procedure.
On each trial, participants were presented with an auditory
stimulus for the length of time specific to the stimulus. Then,
the question “Category A or Category B?” was presented for
1000 ms, during which time the participant was allowed to
respond. After receiving a response, a blank screen was
presented for 1500 ms, before the start of the next trial.
However, if the participant failed to respond within 1000
ms, “TIME OUT” was displayed for 1000 ms followed by a
blank screen for 500ms. Before being debriefed, participants
completed the short questionnaire about the experiment.
2.6 Analysis
All data analyses were conducted in R (R Core Team,
2017). Cohen’s 3 was calculated using the effsize R
package (Torchiano, 2017) and Bayes Factors using the
BayesFactor package (Morey & Rouder, 2018). Bayes
Factors (10) exceeding three were considered evidence
for the experimental hypothesis, while 10 < 13 were con-
sidered evidence for the null; p-values are largely reported as
a traditional courtesy, except where no Bayesian equivalent
was known to us, in which case an alpha level of .05 was
adopted. We also report generalised [2. Trial by trial data,
verbal reports and all analyses for this and three prior pilot
experiments are available at https://osf.io/mcd7v.
2.7 Results
2.7.1 Data rescoring
A Shapiro-Wilks test showed that accuracy in the test phase
in all four conditions violated assumptions of normality,
(? ≤ .001). On visually inspecting the distributions of
accuracy scores during the test phase, both conditions had
distinctly bimodal distributions with peaks around 30% and
70%. Matching peaks 20% away from chance indicates that
all participants were exhibiting systematic behavior related
to the category structure, but were at chance on inferring
which key went with which category label.
There are two ways of solving this problem. One way is to
use non-parametric tests. The other is to rescore the data so
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Table 2: Post-experiment verbal report questionnaire.
Question Type
1 Did you notice any relationship between the first part of the experiment (pictures) and
the second part of the experiment (sounds)?
Yes/No
2 If your answer to Question 1 was YES, please describe the relationship below: Open
3 For the first part of the experiment (pictures), are you able to describe how you decided
whether a picture belonged in category A or category B?
Yes/No
4 If your answer to Question 3 was YES, please describe how you did it below: Open
5 For the second part of the experiment (sounds), are you able to describe how you
decided whether a sound belonged in category A or category B?
Yes/No

























Figure 3: Learning curves of participants. Error bars are
difference-adjusted between-subject 95% confidence inter-
vals (Baguley, 2012).
that it reflects difference from chance. This is where we think
category learning differs from other research on analogical
transfer. In ‘traditional’ analogical transfer problems, such
as the radiation problem, systematicity and accuracy are pos-
itively correlated. The more accurate you are, the better you
have transferred the information from one task to another. In
contrast, for a category learning task, systematicity forms a
U-shaped curve on accuracy. Participants that score 100%
are also perfectly systematic, but so are those that score
0%. Therefore, as we are interested in the ‘systematicity’
of participants responses we chose the later approach. The
rescored performance metrics ‘Systematic difference scores’
are shown in Figure 3 for the transfer conditions and Figure 4
for the test block.
2.7.2 Transfer
Weconducted a 2 (task: CJ, II) x 2 (block: last training block,
test) ANOVA on the data from the full condition. There
was a main effect of block, 10 = 1.4 × 108,  (1, 57) =
142.04, [2 = 0.42, ? < .001: participants scored lower in
the test block than at the end of training. There was also a
main effect of category task, 10 = 1.7 × 106,  (1, 57) =
49.39, [2 = 0.38, ? < .001 : participants scored higher on
average in the II condition, "  = 0.35, ( = 0.08, than in
the CJ condition, " = 0.24, ( = 0.10. The evidence
for an interaction was equivocal, 10 = 1.61,  (1, 57) =
7.25, [2 = 0.04, ? = .009. The numerical trend was for
performance to drop more in the rule-based (CJ) condition
than in the II condition; this is opposite to the pattern reported
in previous work.
2.7.3 Comparison with controls
Here, we examined whether training had any impact on fi-
nal test performance. A 2 (Category structure: CJ, II)
x 2 (Condition: Control, Experimental) ANOVA on test
block accuracy found equivocal evidence for an interac-
tion, 10 = 0.43,  (1, 113) = 1.03, [2 = 0.01, ? = .311,
and evidence for the absence of a main effect of condition,
10 = 0.25,  (1, 113) = 1.07, [2 = 0.01, ? = .302. There
was a main effect of category structure, 10 = 5.2 × 1011,
 (1, 113) = 79.22, [2 = 0.41, ? < .001; participants scored
higher on average on the II structure, "  = 0.29, ( =
0.07, than on the CJ structure, " = 0.17, ( = 0.08.
2.8 Verbal reports
The open questions were coded by the first author (CERE)
and a volunteer (MB). For the answer to Question 2, partici-
pantswere identified by how they paired stimulus dimensions
across the two phases of the experiment. For instance, “short
line matches short tone” would have been coded as length-
duration. The correct relationship was “line length is tone
duration and line position is tone pitch.”
For the answers to Questions 4 and 6, participants were
identified as using one of the following strategies:






















Figure 4: Performance on the auditory test stimuli. Er-
ror bars are difference-adjusted between-subject 95% con-
fidence intervals (Baguley, 2012).
Participants were classified as using a unidimensional rule
if they only mentioned a single stimulus dimension, such as
“if the line was short the stimulus was in Category A, if the
line was long the stimulus was in Category B.”
Participants were classified as using a conjunction rule
if they mentioned both stimulus dimensions and described
categorizing stimuli on the basis of a logical “AND” rule
such as “short stimuli in the top half of the box were in
Category A, otherwise they were in Category B.”
Participants were classified as using a complex rule if they
mentioned both stimulus dimensions and described catego-
rization stimuli on the basis of a series of complicated if
statements, such as “If the line is short it is in Category A,
but if it is long it is in Category B. However, if it is mid-
length then if it is high in the box it is Category B, and if it
is low in the box it is in Category A.”
Participants were classified as other if they did not fall into
one of the groups above. Inter-rater reliability was 82%. All
discrepancies between raters were easily resolved following
discussion.
Table 3 shows the proportion of participants that re-
sponded “yes” to the yes/no questions of Table 2, along with
the corresponding statistical tests. There was evidence for
the absence of a difference between the CJ and II conditions
in the proportions of participants that reported a strategy in
the training phase. The same was true for the test phase.
The evidence was equivocal for a difference between CJ and
II in the proportion of participants who reported noticing a
relationship between the two phases of the experiment. In
the control conditions, numerically more people were able
to report a strategy in the II task than in the CJ task, but the
Bayesian evidence for that difference was equivocal
Next, we looked at the strategies participants reported (see
Table 3: Rows 1-3: Proportion of participants in the ana-
logical transfer conditions responding ’yes’ to verbal report
questions 1, 3, and 5. Row 4: proportion of control partici-
pants responding ’yes’ to their equivalent of question 5. The
chi-squared test (and corresponding Bayes Factor) compare
these proportions between categorization tasks.
CJ II j2 10
Q1. Relationship? 0.65 0.64 0.00 0.34
Q3. Strategy? (Training) 1.00 0.96 0.73 0.14
Q5. Strategy? (Transfer) 0.75 0.79 0.08 0.31
Q5. Strategy? (Controls) 0.86 1.00 4.26 1.09
CJ = Conjunction, II = information-
integration.
Table 4: Proportion of participants reporting each strategy.
Strategies
Phase UD CJ Complex Other
CJ Training 0.05 0.80 0.15 -
Test 0.47 0.40 0.13 -
Control 0.83 - 0.07 0.06
II Training 0.26 0.15 0.59 -
Test 0.73 0.09 0.18 -
Control 0.93 - 0.07 -
Strategies: UD=Unidimensional, CJ=Conjunction,
Complex=Complex multi-dimensional
Table 4). No participants attempted to report anything that
could even be loosely interpreted as implicit responding.
Rather, for participants completing the full experiment, the
majority of participants reported shifting from using two-
dimensional rules during training to unidimensional rules
at test. In the CJ conditions, participants relied more on
a unidimensional strategy in the control group than at test,
10 = 4.12, j2 = 4.95, ? = .026. In contrast, there
was no evidence that this was the case in the II conditions,
10 = 1.46, j2 = 3.72, ? = .054. This interaction reached
significance, 10 = 7.15, j2 = 12.65, ? = .013. There was
no evidence to suggest that participants relied less on the
default unidimensional categorization strategy following CJ
training than II training, 10 = 1.31, j2 = 2.58, ? = .109.
Finally, we looked at the proportion of participants in the
full experiment conditions that were able to correctly spec-
ify the correct transfer mapping. In the rule-based condition,
38% of participants correctly specified the transfer relation-
ship, and 5% of those in the II condition. The Bayesian
evidence for this difference was equivocal, 10 = 1.75,
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j2 = 3.81, ? = .051. No participants were identified as
using a different mapping (such as height of bar to length
of tone). In the CJ condition, participants who reported the
correct mapping performed worse, " = 0.14, than those
who reported an incorrect mapping, " = 0.18, although
the evidence for this difference equivocal, 10 = 0.59,
C (11) = −0.70, ? = .501.
3 Discussion
Analogical reasoning is crucial to transferring knowledge in
many tasks and domains (Barnett & Ceci, 2002; Gentner
& Maravilla, 2018). However, the role analogical reason-
ing plays in transferring category knowledge has only been
partially explored. Some studies have explored analogical
reasoning in near transfer, where the pre-transfer and post-
transfer tasks are in the same context (Casale et al., 2012;
Soto & Ashby, 2019; Zakrzewski et al., 2018). They found
that successful analogical transfer was contingent on the cat-
egory structure: transfer was easier following UD training
than II training.
We extended the literature by investigating far transfer of
category knowledge; in this case where category knowledge
might have been transferred between two different modali-
ties. Participants were trained on a visual task and tested on
an auditory task with the same underlying structure. There
was evidence that, compared to the relevant control condi-
tions, fewer participants used a unidimensional strategy in
the CJ conditions than the II conditions. However, unlike the
studies of near transfer, this did not result in improved accu-
racy: participants who received training on the visual task
achieved the same levels of accuracy in the auditory task as
those who did not receive training, irrespective of category
structure.
The current findings contrast those in reasoning tasks,
where analogical reasoning improves performance in the sec-
ond task despite substantial changes in surface form (Barnett
& Ceci, 2002; Gentner & Maravilla, 2018). This contrast
may be due to task differences. In both kinds of task, partici-
pantsmight identify the optimum strategy, yet have problems
implementing it. However, these problems of implementa-
tion seem likely to be more severe for a categorization task
than a classic reasoning task. For example, knowing that
“small” stimuli are in one category and “large” stimuli are in
another can be hard to apply effectively if you do not know
how small is “small” and how large “large”. It it possible
that these fine-grained adjustments require feedback.
3.1 Learning versus default strategy use
In the control condition of the current experiment, classifica-
tion of the auditory stimuli was performed in the absence of
prior in-experiment training, and in the absence of feedback.
We found, as others have previously (Ashby et al., 1999;Mil-
ton et al., 2008;Wills et al., 2015), that people do not guess in
such situations, they instead apply a default, typically single-
dimensional, strategy. It is reasonable to assume that they
might at least start with a similar default strategy even when
feedback is available. The issue this creates is that applying
a single-dimension strategy to CJ and II category structures
leads to substantially above-chance responding (optimally,
75% correct for the current structures). This is important
because learning is usually taken to mean some relatively
permanent adaptation to the environment, rather than simply
applying an existing strategy to a novel situation. Hence, one
should not use above-chance responding in CJ and II tasks
as evidence of category learning, because an alternative ex-
planation of above-chance responding is that participants
applying an existing strategy. In the current work, the high
performance of unidimensional strategies on a conjunction
task mean that we may have inadvertently limited the possi-
ble performance benefit from training. One possible solution
to this issue would be to use category structures where uni-
dimensional strategies score at chance levels (e.g. Donkin et
al., 2015).
3.2 Relationship to the COVIS model
According to the COVIS (COmpetition between Verbal and
Implicit Systems) model (Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, &
Waldron, 1998), the pattern of near transfer shown in Casale
et al. (2012), Zakrzewski et al. (2018) and Soto and Ashby
(2019) occurs because different neural systems underlie per-
formance in rule-based (UD and CJ) and II tasks. Partici-
pants can analogically transfer knowledge between different
rule-based tasks because the Explicit System learns them
using rules (Ashby et al., 1998). In contrast, participants fail
to transfer knowledge of II tasks because they are learned by
the implicit, Procedural System.
The results of the current study neither strongly support
nor rule out the COVIS account. On one hand, consistent
with COVIS, more people were able to report the correct
relationship in the CJ condition than in the II condition (al-
though the Bayesian evidence for this difference was incon-
clusive). On the other hand, COVIS hypothesizes that the
II task is learned implicitly, yet most people reported using
a rule-based strategy in this condition (see also Edmunds et
al., 2015, 2016, 2019).
Existing published accounts of COVIS are unclear about
the possibility of cross-modal transfer of rule-based cate-
gories. On the one hand, cross-modal transfer is a form
of analogical transfer, and analogical transfer of rule-based
categories is expected and has been reported. On the other
hand, the specific issue of cross-modal transfer in COVIS
has not been covered in either published accounts or formal
computational implementations. On the basis of the current
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results, we suggest that it may not be necessary to provide
COVIS with a mechanism for cross-modal transfer.
3.3 Conclusion
In contrast to previous work on near analogical transfer
Casale et al. (2012); Soto and Ashby (2019); Zakrzewski
et al. (2018) in perceptual categorization, we found no bene-
ficial effect of far, cross-modal, analogical transfer in either
rule-based or information-integration category structures.
3.4 Author contributions
CERE (lead author): Rationale, theory, design, program-
ming, data collection, data analysis, writeup. ABI: Ratio-
nale, theory, design. Programming and analysis of pilot
studies. PMJ: Design. FM: Rationale, theory, design.
Consulted on analysis and write up as co-author. AJW:
Rationale, theory, design, write up. Consulted on analysis.
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Most studies in the COVIS canon include analysis of par-
ticipants’ strategies. This is required to patch a logical hole
in the design of these experiments (Edmunds et al., 2018).
Recall that COVIS predicts the existence of two compet-
ing learning systems and that each system is hypothesised
to optimally learn particular category structures. However,
for any given COVIS experiment, there is no guarantee that
participants are using the optimal system for the category
structure they learn. Therefore, any dissociation in accuracy
may reflect participants using the “wrong” system, rather
than reflecting properties of the systems under study. To rule
this possibility out, studies investigating the predictions of
the COVIS model use a decision-bound model-based analy-
sis to check that the strategies participants use are consistent
with the category structure and the system they are supposed
to be using.
This decision-bound strategy analysis is informed by a
multi-dimensional version of signal detection theory: Gen-
eral Recognition Theory (Ashby & Gott, 1988; Ashby &
Maddox, 1993). Broadly, it involves fitting several different
strategy models to the data from each participant and seeing
which one fits the best. Following Casale et al. (2012), here
we fitted three types of strategy: unidimensional, general
linear classifier and random. Additionally, we also included
a conjunction model as this would be the optimum strategy
for the rule-based category structure used here. For ease of
exposition, all strategies are framed in terms of the visual
stimuli (an example is shown in Figure 2, in the main text).
Unidimensional This strategy corresponds to a unidimen-
sional rule such as “Stimuli with short lines are in one cate-
gory, those with long lines are in the other.” Two parameters:
position of the decision bound and noise.
Conjunction This strategy corresponds to a conjunction
rule such as “Stimuli with short lines high in the box are
in Category A, otherwise they are in Category B.” Three
parameters: two defining the decision boundary plus noise.
General linear classifier Within theCOVIS literature, this
strategy is regarded as being learned implicitly. It corre-
sponds to the strategy “If the line is longer than it is high
then it is in CategoryA, otherwise the stimulus is in Category
B.” Three parameters: two defining the decision boundary
plus noise.
Random Two random models, one with one parameter
(bias), one with no parameters.
The best fit of these models was determined using the
Bayesian Information Criterion. The best fitting models for
each participant are shown in Table 5. Also reported are the
Bayesian weights for the success of each model (Wagenmak-
ers & Farrell, 2004). Code for these models fits are available
at https://osf.io/mcd7v
Notes on interpretation
The results of this strategy analysis are reported here for com-
pleteness and for comparison with other work investigating
the COVIS model. However, as mentioned briefly in the
main text, we have serious concerns about whether this form
of strategy analysis accurately reflects the strategies that par-
ticipants are using. Previous work, by ourselves and others,
have shown that the output of this analysis critically depends
on the category structure under consideration as well as the
strategy models included, regardless of the strategies actu-
ally used by the participants (Donkin et al., 2015; Edmunds
et al., 2018). For instance, Edmunds et al. (2018) found that
approximately 50% of simulated participants who learned
an information-integration category structure using a rule-
based strategy were misidentified by the analysis as using
the optimum, diagonal strategy. Therefore, the strategies
reported here should be interpreted very cautiously.
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Table 5: Decision-bound strategy analysis.
Block Strategy (wBIC)
UD CJ GLC RAND
Conjunction 4 0.10 (0.70) 0.77 (0.84) 0.13 (0.60) -
Test 0.57 (0.72) 0.13 (0.64) 0.07 (0.47) 0.23 (0.72)
Control 0.86 (0.69) - 0.03 (0.54) 0.10 (0.79)
Information-integration 4 0.28 (0.72) 0.10 (0.68) 0.62 (0.92) -
Test 0.72 (0.72) 0.07 (0.49) 0.17 (0.73) 0.03 (0.76)
Control 0.97 (0.72) - - 0.03 (0.77)
Strategies: UD=Unidimensional, CJ=Conjunction, GLC=Diagonal general linear classifier,
RAND=Random.
